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Medicare+Choice
As the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program enters its
third year, most observers and participants agree that
recent trends for the program are discouraging. Intended by Congress to expand choice of health plans for
Medicare beneficiaries, the number of M+C contracts
declined in 2000, and beneficiary enrollment figures
have been flat. And, while a few new players have
recently entered the program, by most accounts the
program has failed to meet the expectations envisioned
by the policymakers who created it as part of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA).
In June and July, several of the largest commercial
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) announced
plans to withdraw next year from the Medicare program
in numerous markets. Aetna U.S. Health Care will
cancel coverage for more than 355,000 beneficiaries in
14 states; CIGNA HealthCare will exit most of its
Medicare HMO markets, affecting about 104,000
beneficiaries in 11 states; Humana will stop offering its
Medicare HMO in 45 counties in 6 states, disenrolling
about 84,000 people; and several other large and small
plans have announced they will discontinue certain
Medicare contracts. In total, 65 HMOs chose not to
renew their M+C contracts and 53 reduced their service
areas, affecting more than 934,000 Medicare beneficiaries—nearly triple the number of beneficiaries who
were affected last year.1
These plan withdrawals have prompted many
policymakers to worry about the future of the Medicare+
Choice program. This Forum session will examine the
most recent data regarding M+C plan participation,
benefit coverage, and enrollment as well as the factors
that have contributed to plans’ decisions to participate
in or withdraw from certain markets. Findings from
the most recent General Accounting Office (GAO)
studies on plan withdrawals and the costs of Medicare
managed care relative to fee-for-service (scheduled to
be released in mid- and late August) will be presented.
In addition, the session will explore what has been
happening to M+C enrollees in terms of costs, benefits, and continuity of care. This issue brief will also
examine the reasons why alternative plan options
—such as preferred provider organizations and
provider-sponsored organizations—have failed to take
hold. Finally, recent legislative proposals that might
affect the future of Medicare+Choice will be discussed.

PLAN PARTICIPATION TRENDS
Prior to enactment of the BBA, plan participation in
the Medicare-risk program (the precursor to M+C) had
been trending upward. Between 1990 and 1998, the
number of Medicare risk contracts had grown from 96
to 346. In 1999, the number of M+C contracts declined
to 309 and in 2000 dropped to 263. This recent plan
termination behavior is similar to that experienced in
the late 1980s, but many more enrollees have been
affected over the past three years because enrollment
was much smaller in the 1980s than today. Before 1998,
enrollment and plan participation in the Medicare risk
program had been sizable and growing strongly. In
2000, 69 percent of beneficiaries had risk plans available to them as health plan options, a decline from 74
percent in 1998.2
Many factors have been cited as reasons for the
recent withdrawals. Industry officials point to inadequate funding, overregulation, and difficulty establishing provider networks as the primary factors. Other
analysts have attributed plan decisions to additional
factors, such as low plan enrollment, strong competition, and general market conditions.3 A study by
Mathematica Policy researchers Randall Brown and
Marsha Gold, published in Health Affairs in 1999,
identified eight characteristics that influence the growth
of Medicare managed care: (a) payment level, (b)
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historical presence of managed care, (c) practice
patterns and care expectations, (d) supplemental coverage, (e) extent and form of provider organization, (f)
Medicaid managed care, (g) state regulatory patterns,
and (h) geographic location.4 (See Table 1 for an
analysis of how these characteristics promote or impede
the growth of Medicare managed care.)
This issue brief will focus on five factors that have
reportedly contributed to plans’ decisions to withdraw
from certain markets. They include (a) payment levels,
(b) uncertainty, (c) geographic location, (d) regulatory
complexity, and (e) market responsiveness.

Payment Levels
In 1997, in response to widespread criticism associated with the previous adjusted average per capita cost
(AAPCC) payment system, Congress substantially
restructured the system for setting the rates that Medicare pays health plans. The AAPCC methodology
tracked variation in fee-for-service spending at the
county level. Under the old system, some areas received
high payments that enabled health plans to offer extra
benefits at little or no added cost to Medicare enrollees.
But in low-payment areas, enrollees have had to pay
substantial out-of-pocket costs for benefits beyond the

Table 1
Factors That Promote or Impede the Growth of Medicare Managed Care
Factor

a

Effect on Medicare Managed care

Capitation level

Higher payment rates mean more potential for plans to earn profits, charge
low premiums, and provide enhanced benefitsa

Historic managed care patterns
(non-Medicare)

Higher managed care penetration historically means greater likelihood of
managed care choices, greater beneficiary familiarity with choices, and
higher proportion of area physicians affiliated with managed care plansa

Practice patterns and
beneficiaries’ care expectations

More resource-intensive practice style and speciality orientation reduce
ability to offer generous benefit package and restrict networkb

Beneficiary characteristics and
pattern of supplemental coverage

Greater growth potential in price-sensitive markets where beneficiaries lack
employer coverage and incomes are limiteda
Lower growth potential where Medicaid or employer-subsidized coverage
for retirees is extensive unless these payers encourage enrollmentb

Extent and form of provider
organization

Managed care easier to develop with more organization and integrationa
Smoother relationships with provider risk sharinga

Concurrent goals and trends in
other lines of business
(commercial, Medicaid)

Efforts to expand managed care to other lines of business will encourage
organization and increase attractiveness of Medicare managed carea

State regulatory context

More extensive regulation generally impedes managed care growthb

Geographic location of market

Close proximity to other markets where Medicare managed care is
successful encourages growtha

Factor promotes Medicare managed care growth.
Factor impedes Medicare managed care growth.
Source: Randall S. Brown and Marsha R. Gold, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., “MarketWatch: What Drives Medicare
Managed Care Growth,” Health Affairs, 18, no. 6 (November/December 1999), 144. Reprinted with permission.
b
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Medicare entitlement, even though all beneficiaries pay
the same Part B premium, regardless of where they live.
The new system was intended to address inequities
across counties and to weaken the link between local
fee-for-service costs and payment updates to plans.
Under the new payment system, a rate for a particular
county is the greater of three possible rates: a new
minimum or floor payment, a minimum 2 percent
increase over the previous year’s rate, or a blend of the
county rate and an input-price-adjusted national rate
subject to a budget-neutrality test.5 As a result of BBAmandated budget neutrality and minimum payment
constraints, however, no counties received a blended
payment rate in 1998 or 1999. In 2000, the budget
neutrality factor resulted in slight increases in blended
county payments, but again in 2001 no plans will
receive blended payments.
According to the American Association of Health
Plans (AAHP) and the Health Insurance Association of
America (HIAA), the BBA changes resulted in inadequate funding of the M+C program relative to costs.
While Medicare fee-for-service spending is estimated to
increase by 5.6 percent next year, payments for most
M+C plans will increase by only 2 percent, according
to AAHP.6 For many plans, M+C rate increases have
not kept pace with medical inflation. Unable to realize
sufficient margins, a large number of these plans have
decided they must pull out of some markets. Indeed,
many plans have sustained sizable losses, according to
industry surveys. In recent testimony before Congress,
George Renaudin, senior vice president of administration for Ochsner Health Plan, said the ratio of medical
costs to total reimbursements is 111 percent for his
plan’s M+C members. “No health plan can survive
while paying 11 percent more in health care benefits
than it receives in payments,” remarked Renaudin.7
But the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) asserts that the Medicare program pays more
than enough for the basic benefit package. GAO’s
ongoing work also shows that payments to plans for their
Medicare enrollees continues to exceed the expected feefor-service costs of these individuals. Plans have had
more difficulty funding extra benefits—especially prescription drug benefits—than they did previously, but
M+C plans were able to offer these extra benefits only
“because of excessive payments made to them before the
BBA,” according to according Robert Berenson, director
of HCFA’s Center for Health Plans and Providers.8
HCFA maintains, moreover, that insufficient reimbursement does not adequately explain plan decisions
to pull out of the program. In 1999, counties with the

largest increases experienced the most disruption. Plan
withdrawals in 1999 affected 11.1 percent of enrollees
in counties where rates were rising by 10 percent, but
affected only 2.3 percent of enrollees where rates were
rising by just 2 percent.9 A 1999 GAO study found that
91 percent of high-payment-rate counties experienced
a plan withdrawal, compared with 34 percent of lowpayment counties.10 But a higher proportion of enrollees
living in low payment rate counties were affected,
compared to enrollees in high payment rate counties,
according to GAO.
According to HCFA, the average M+C growth rate
was 5 percent in 2000, and in some areas it grew as
much as 18 percent, but these high growth rates were
typically in areas with few enrollees. An AAHP analysis of HCFA data found that 40 percent of enrollees live
in areas that received a 2 percent update and more than
57 percent of enrollees live in areas that received
updates of 3.5 percent or less. HCFA’s most recent data
show that enrollees in lower payment areas are more
likely to be affected by nonrenewals in 2001 than
beneficiaries in higher payment areas.11

Uncertainty
In its March 2000 report to Congress, the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) identified
uncertainty as another concern that may be discouraging participating M+C plans. The advent of risk-adjusted payments for M+C plans has heightened anxiety
about the predictability of future revenue streams.
Because health status—not just demographic factors—is considered in payment, plans have more
uncertainty in predicting future revenues. Several health
plans have cited concern about risk adjustment as a key
factor in their decisions to retreat from Medicare.
Under the BBA, HCFA is required to implement,
beginning January 1, 2000, a method to base plan
payments on beneficiaries’ health status. On average,
this method will reduce payment to M+C plans somewhat for most beneficiaries but increase plan payments
significantly for the minority of beneficiaries who were
hospitalized in the prior year for specific conditions
(such as congestive heart failure). HCFA’s proposed
method has been met by considerable criticism because
it initially relies on hospital inpatient data alone. HMOs
state that they will be unfairly penalized for effectively
managing the health of their members, particularly in
terms of reducing hospitalization. HCFA estimates that
its new risk adjustment methodology will result in a
reduction of payments to health plans by nearly $6
billion over five years, with the largest decreases
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occurring in the later years, when encounter data from
multiple sites of care will be used in the calculations.
In the face of program instability, HCFA proposed to
phase in the new interim risk adjustment system slowly,
basing only 10 percent of plan payments on the risk
adjusters in 2000, and gradually increasing the percentage
until all payments were risk adjusted in 2004. The Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (BBRA) pushed
the transition back even further, and several pending
Medicare reform proposals would make additional
changes to the risk adjustment rules. HCFA announced on
June 19, 2000, that it would adjust the phase-in schedule
once again and that it planned to announce the new
schedule in January 2001. That schedule, said HCFA,
would be based upon agency research on the collection of
encounter data and a report by MedPAC on the new risk
adjustment procedure as required by BBRA (and scheduled to be released in December 2000).
All of the proposed legislative and regulatory changes
only exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding the M+C
program and its future payments, further discouraging
participation in the program. As stated in MedPAC’s
March 2000 report:
It is difficult for managed care organizations to
construct business plans if each year the rules for
phasing in risk adjustment change, the amount of
[graduate medical education] carveouts differs, or the
administrative requirements change. For a plan, it is
difficult not only to predict its own performance, but
also to understand its competitors.12

Furthermore, recent congressional activity regarding the
possibility of adding a prescription drug benefit to the
basic Medicare benefit package puts into question M+C
marketing strategies for the future. Most of the proposals would build on the current M+C model to distribute
the benefit; these proposals are discussed in more detail
later in this paper.

Geographic Location
Providing more choices for Medicare beneficiaries
who live in rural and lower-payment counties was a key
objective of the creators of the Medicare+Choice program. This result has not materialized. M+C plan participation remains highly concentrated in urban areas in the
West, Northeast, and Florida. Five states—California,
Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas—account
for about 57 percent of the total M+C enrolled population,
according to the most recent HCFA data.
The vast majority of rural beneficiaries have never
had access to a managed care plan. The minimum

payment floor was established as an incentive for plans
to enter rural counties, but despite payment rate increases, participation in rural areas has declined overall
recently. Only 10 percent of beneficiaries in counties at
the floor rate will have access to an M+C plan in 2001,
while 97 percent of beneficiaries with rates above $550
will have M+C plans available as an option (Table 2).
In its March 2000 report, MedPAC said that “bringing more choice to underserved areas remains an
intractable problem.” Plans often experience tremendous difficulty in developing or maintaining provider
networks in rural areas because the limited number of
providers are reluctant to contract with plans. Plans at
full risk may simply not make sense in some rural areas,
according to panelists who testified before MedPAC on
rural Medicare policy issues. In addition, MedPAC’s
analysis of lower-payment areas suggests “plans may
have trouble providing even the basic benefit and
making a profit.”13

Regulatory Complexity
A persistent complaint of M+C plans concerns the
costs and burdens of complying with extensive M+C
regulation. The requirements include complicated
enrollment and disenrollment regulations, quality
improvement initiatives, and encounter data reporting.
A report by Bruce M. Fried and Janice Ziegler, sponsored by the HIAA, documents just how complex and
detailed the rules governing the M+C program are.14
The M+C interim final regulation, published on June
26, 1998, for example, is over 90 pages long, as printed
in the Federal Register. In addition, between 1995 and
June 2000, HCFA had issued over 120 operational
policy letters (OPLs) detailing program requirements—many of which were related to the implementation of BBA changes. According to Fried and Ziegler,
each new OPL requires review, interpretation, and
implementation where changes are necessary.
In response to concerns regarding regulatory burden,
HCFA has begun a number of initiatives designed to
further streamline administrative procedures. For
example, HCFA has simplified the requirements for
provider contracts and has revised marketing guidelines. The agency also plans to issue a single manual for
M+C operations this year and then update that manual
quarterly to replace the need for most OPLs. HCFA’s
June 29 final rule governing the operations of health
plans participating in the M+C program represents the
agency’s attempt to respond to plan concerns. According to a HCFA press release,15 the new regulations
improve earlier regulations by doing the following:
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Table 2
Availability of Plans with Selected Benefits, 1999-2000
Total eligible
Any Plan
beneficiaries
(in millions) 1999 2000
2001*

Zero-premium
plan
1999
2000

Plan with Rx
coverage
1999
2000

Zero-premium
plan with Rx
1999
2000

39

71%

69%

63%

61%

53%

65%

64%

54%

45%

4

14

15

10

5

3

12

12

3

2

$401.62-$449.99

12

50

47

29

29

18

39

40

18

14

$450-$550

14

86

81

66

78

67

81

76

70

52

> $550

10

97

97

97

97

94

96

96

95

91

Rural areas

9

23

21

14

14

9

19

16

8

6

Urban areas

30

86

83

78

75

66

80

79

68

57

National
County rate/month
$401.61 (floor)

*2001 figures, also based on MedPAC analysis, are preliminary and do not include access to private fee-for-service plans.
Source: MedPAC analysis of Medicare Compare data from HCFA website, August 1999 and January 2000 from Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, 120.







Increasing flexibility in establishing a provider
network, which will allow more health care providers to serve plan enrollees.
Improving freedom of choice by allowing plans to
offer beneficiaries a point-of-service option that
broadens access to health care services from both innetwork and out-of-network providers.
Allowing organizations that left M+C to return in
two years, instead of five.
Implementing the bonus payment program called for
in the BBRA to encourage M+C plans to begin
serving beneficiaries in areas that currently do not
have M+C options.

Market Responsiveness
According to GAO, “the current movement of plans in
and out of Medicare may primarily be the normal reaction
of plans to market competition and conditions.”16 In fact,
some analysts have said this behavior should come as no
surprise. In testimony before Congress, Marilyn Moon,
senior fellow at the Urban Institute, said,
In a market system, withdrawals should be expected:
indeed, they are a natural part of the process by which
uncompetitive plans that cannot attract enough enrollees leave particular markets. . . . In fact, if no plans

ever left, that would likely be a sign that competition
was not working well.17

Clearly, plans have responded differently to market
conditions and have seemed to make explicit business
decisions about whether or not they want to continue
working with the Medicare program for the long term. For
instance, both Aetna and CIGNA dropped the majority of
their Medicare enrollees, whereas Pacificare dropped 2
percent and Kaiser dropped 0.2 percent of current Medicare enrollees. Many plans have opted to change their
benefit packages rather than withdraw from the program.
Fried and Ziegler’s analysis takes exception to the
notion that plans have simply responded to “market
forces.” These forces, they contend, were a direct result
of changes in payment rates. Increased administrative
and other costs relative to payment rates have forced
M+C plans to decrease supplemental benefits or impose
higher premiums, which in turn has discouraged enrollment. Lower enrollment levels result in smaller margins
and, in some markets, actual losses, according to Fried
and Ziegler.18
Others have pointed to the condition of the overall
managed care market as a significant factor affecting
the decisions of HMOs to withdraw from the M+C
program. InterStudy’s 1999 HMO Forecasting Report
painted a bleak picture for HMOs:
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HMOs are struggling to find equilibrium in a competitive environment created by providers, consumers,
and employers. Providers are asking to be paid more.
Consumers are demanding more choice and access in
selecting and using medical care. And finally, employers are saying that the cost of health care is too high.19

But others believe the HMO withdrawals signal the
precarious nature of relying on the private market to
deliver publicly funded benefits. Esther Canja, president
of AARP, told Congress last year that
when private businesses are given the authority to
manage a beneficiary’s care in exchange for the
opportunity to earn a profit, several things can happen. On the positive side, the innovations in administrative efficiency and improved health care delivery
may benefit the patient through lower costs, additional
benefits, and better coordinated care. On the other
hand, patients can be exposed to the vagaries of the
market place. They may force instability in their
benefits and premium charges, and worse yet, beneficiaries may not know from one year to the next
whether their plan will remain a Medicare option.20

Foundation-sponsored “Survey of Experiences with
Medicare HMOs” found that two-thirds (66 percent) of
Medicare beneficiaries who were involuntarily disenrolled from their HMO enrolled in another HMO that
served their area.21 (See Figure 1.) Fifteen percent of
beneficiaries purchased Medigap coverage, 4 percent
were covered by their or their spouse’s employersponsored plan, and 1 percent received assistance from
Medicaid. The remaining beneficiaries either went back
to fee-for-service Medicare or their current arrangement
is unknown. Information from two draft studies conducted by the Health and Human Services Department’s
Office of the Inspector General found that 17 percent of
disenrolled beneficiaries chose fee-for-service Medicare
over another HMO, even when there was a choice for
contract year 1999, and 15 percent chose fee-for-service
over another HMO for contract year 2000.

Figure 1
Distribution of Disenrolled Beneficiaries,
by New Coverage Arrangement

ENROLLMENT AND BENEFIT TRENDS
Medicare HMO enrollment increased steadily each
year between 1985 and 1995. Between 1995 and 1999,
however, it more than doubled, growing from about 3
million to 6.3 million. After peaking in December 1999,
enrollment has remained flat in 2000 and even declined
somewhat this year. As of July 1, 2000, 6.24 million
beneficiaries were enrolled in coordinated care plans. In
2000, 69 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have access
to one or more M+C plans, down from 71 percent in
1999. Beneficiaries living in nine states have no access
to a M+C plan in 2000.
As stated earlier, plan withdrawals have affected a
significant number of beneficiaries over the past three
years. In January 1999, 407,000 beneficiaries were
involuntarily disenrolled from their HMOs; an additional
327,000 had to find new coverage arrangements in 2000.
Approximately 934,000 Medicare beneficiaries will be
affected by plans’ decisions to leave the M+C program in
2001. About 775,000 of the affected beneficiaries will be
able to enroll in another Medicare HMO, if the HMO is
accepting enrollees. HCFA estimates that about 17
percent or 159,000 of the remaining beneficiaries will be
left with no M+C HMO options, although some may
choose to enroll in a private fee-for-service plan (discussed below) if one is available in their community.
Concern about the effects of these withdrawals on
beneficiaries has increased each year as the exodus of
plans receives more publicity. A Kaiser Family

Based on a nationally representative sample of 1,830 beneficiaries
involuntarily terminated from a Medicare HMO as of January 1,
1999.
Note: Total percentages may not sum to 100 percent due to
rounding.
Source: Barents Group analysis of the Kaiser Family Foundation–sponsored “Survey of Experiences with Medicare HMOs.”

Benefit Changes
The Kaiser Family Foundation survey also found
that, overall, many of the beneficiaries who were
involuntarily disenrolled from their Medicare HMO
experienced a decline in supplemental benefits, an
increase in their premiums for these benefits, and some
disruption in medical care arrangements. Thirty-five
percent of survey respondents reported having fewer
supplemental benefits under their new coverage arrangements, compared with some 20 percent who

8
reported a gain in benefits. Twenty-two percent of
respondents reported having a different primary care
provider and 17 percent reported having to change
specialists after their HMOs withdrew from the market.
HCFA points out that changes in access to M+C and
changes in the coverage and premiums for the year
2000 vary significantly by state and between urban and
rural areas. In some areas, there were few changes in
benefits or premiums, while in other areas, there were
significant changes.22 On average, plans continuing in
the M+C program have reduced benefit packages and
increased premiums. According to MedPAC, in 2000,
53 percent of beneficiaries have access to “zero”
premium plans, which means beneficiaries pay no
additional premium beyond the Medicare Part B premium. This represents a decline from 61 percent of
beneficiaries in 1999. (See Table 2.) On average,
individuals who were enrolled in a plan in 1999 that is
still available in 2000 faced a premium increase of $11
per month for the basic benefit package. The percentage
of M+C plans offering outpatient prescription drug
coverage declined slightly from 65 percent in 1999 to
64 percent in 2000, according to MedPAC.
A recent study by Amanda Cassidy and Marsha Gold
of Mathematica Policy Research found that, while large
monthly premiums are still relatively rare, the premiums
charged can be quite substantial.23 According to the study,
monthly premiums of $50 or more are required in 23
percent of the basic plans in 2000, nearly three times as
many as in 1999 (8 percent). According to AAHP, this
trend is likely to continue in 2001. But while premiums
are increasing, a majority of plans continue to offer
supplemental benefits, including drug coverage and
preventive dental benefits. Plans seem to be holding the
line on the annual dollar limit of pharmacy benefits, but
more are likely to use copayments and/or formularies to
steer enrollees to less expensive drugs, according to the
Mathematica study. HCFA has found that the dollar limits
for drug coverage have increased significantly. For
example, in the last two years, the proportion of plans that
limit drug coverage to $500 or less has increased by 50
percent. In 2000, about 75 percent of plans have annual
dollar limits of $1,000 or less.24
These reductions in benefit packages decrease the
attractiveness of Medicare managed care and therefore
contribute to enrollment challenges for the remaining
plans. Plans may have more trouble attracting beneficiaries to managed care without inducements such as drug
coverage and zero premiums. On the other hand, remaining plans may be flooded with enrollees who have
lost their coverage, creating concerns about the plans’

capacity to absorb these new enrollees. Some plans have
asked HCFA to allow them to cap their enrollment so
that they can more accurately predict costs and manage
enrollees’ medical care. For example, in Maryland, only
one plan, Kaiser Permanente of the Mid-Atlantic States,
will remain in 2001, while the other three plans have
pulled out, affecting 55,000 Medicare beneficiaries.
Kaiser recently announced a freeze on enrollment and is
awaiting HCFA approval for a plan to cap enrollment
for 2001.25 Currently, Kaiser’s Medicare HMO covers
about 27,000 beneficiaries in the Washington-Baltimore
area. It recently decided to limit plan members’ choice
of doctors to only those working at Kaiser facilities.
Kaiser also announced plans to sharply increase premiums in the region (for example, from $19 to $79 in the
Baltimore area).26

Consumer Confidence
Beneficiary advocates have reported growing
anxiety among beneficiaries about the reliability of the
M+C program. Many beneficiaries have been confused
by press reports surrounding plan withdrawals and,
often unaware that only certain counties are affected,
assume their benefits have been canceled throughout
entire regions. The withdrawals have heightened
awareness that plans can leave the market and may
reduce the willingness of some Medicare beneficiaries
to enroll in plans in the next few years.
As stated earlier, about 15 percent of those who
could have chosen another managed care plan instead
chose to return to the original fee-for-service Medicare
program. They may have done so because a switch to a
new plan would have required them to change doctors
or because they had lost confidence in a Medicare
HMO as an option. According to the Kaiser Family
Foundation survey, about one-half of respondents who
had not joined another HMO said they were not likely
to join another Medicare HMO in the near future.
Employers—who once championed moving their
retirees into M+C plans—have begun to have serious
concerns about the disruptions caused by plan withdrawals. Complaints from retirees have created public
relations headaches that most employers seek to avoid.
Moreover, some of the nation’s largest employers have
seen their monthly M+C premiums double for a retiree
health package with unlimited drug coverage; however,
they are still considerably lower than Medigap premiums. In addition, the unpredictability of premium rates
makes it difficult to determine retiree health liabilities
as required by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board. Nonetheless, Medicare HMOs are still the best
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deal in terms of value for employers covering retirees,
according to Joe Martingale, who oversees the Medicar
e+Choice initiative on behalf of 60 large employers for
Towers Perrin.27
Wall Street has also turned a cold shoulder toward
M+C. At a recent gathering of Wall Street analysts
sponsored by the Center for Studying Health System
Change, not a single analyst on the panel recommended
that managed care plans participate in the program. In
fact, they said they had been advising companies that
M+C was a losing proposition. Companies pulling out
of M+C were rewarded with higher stock prices as
investors responded favorably to the withdrawals.28

NEW PLAYERS IN M+C (OR LACK
THEREOF)
When Congress created the M+C program, it was
intended to give beneficiaries the opportunity to choose
between the existing Medicare fee-for-service program
and a wide range of alternative plans, including managed care options, such as HMOs, preferred provider
organizations (PPOs), and provider-sponsored organizations (PSOs), as well as private fee-for-service plans
and medical savings account (MSA) plans. To date, this
objective has not been achieved. No MSA plans have
applied to participate in the program. As indicated
earlier, many HMOs have decided to withdraw from the
program in several areas of the country and other new
plan options have rarely been utilized.
Since July 1998, HCFA has approved 58 applications for M+C plans to begin service or expand a
service area.29 HCFA recently approved its first private
fee-for-service option and is currently reviewing five
new M+C applications, including two preferred
provider-type organizations. Five current M+C plans
submitted service area expansions. An AAHP analysis
of HCFA data found that the number of M+C contracts
and service area expansions approved by HCFA has
fallen substantially.30 In the first six months of 2000,
HCFA approved only eight new M+C contracts and
eight service area expansions. In 1999, HCFA approved
26 new contracts and 26 service area expansions,
compared with 55 new contracts and 46 service area
expansions in 1998 and 53 new contracts and 38 service
area expansions in 1997.

Preferred Provider Organizations
As far back as 1995, in the first round of Medicare
reform activity under a new Republican leadership,

greater choice of plans and a desire to shift risk from
the government to health plans were put forward as key
objectives. Lawmakers promised that PPOs with broad
networks, no requirements to see a primary care “gatekeeper” for specialist referral, and out-of-network
treatment options would be available to Medicare
beneficiaries. As a result, PPOs were duly included
among organizations eligible to contract with HCFA
under what became Medicare+Choice—provided, that
is, that they could demonstrate their ability to bear full
financial risk and meet requirements for consumer
protection, quality assurance, and solvency.
Bearing risk, in the form of accepting a capitated
payment per member per month to provide any and all
care that might prove needed, was the first threshhold. In
1995, the American Association of Preferred Provider
Organizations could not identify among its members any
PPO bearing full financial risk. Some managed health
care organizations offered a capitated HMO product
alongside a PPO, but PPO reimbursement continued to
follow the pattern of discounted fee-for-service.
Medicare+Choice was preceded by a HCFA-sponsored demonstration project known as “Medicare
Choices,” which debuted in 1996 and was designed to test
variations on the standard reimbursement model. While
several PPOs were included initially, only one is operating as a M+C contractor today. Personal Choice 65, a
PPO offered by Independence Blue Cross and Blue
Shield (Pennsylvania), has approximately 14,000 enrollees. These beneficiaries pay an additional premium (as
compared with a more tightly managed HMO option) for
geographic flexibility and freedom from gatekeeping.
Both options offer a limited prescription drug benefit.
In general, PPOs, which are characterized by looser
networks and fewer care management tools, have found
compliance with M+C requirements more challenging
than tightly organized and managed plans. An Independence executive observed that Personal Choice 65
had to make numerous adjustments to qualify under
M+C. In addition to reimbursement challenges, the
PPO has found it difficult to comply with M+C requirements because the regulations are based on an HMO
model. Thus, PPOs do not really fit into standard
designs for membership materials or the Medicare
Compare Web site.
The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association raised
similar concerns with respect to performance measurement and quality improvement, pointing out that PPOs
were not designed to manage clinical performance, as
originally called for in the BBA and echoed in some
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versions of patient protection legislation. A provision in
the BBRA exempted PPOs from compliance with some
quality improvement requirements under M+C and called
upon MedPAC to study what quality measurements
would be appropriate for various types of Medicare plans.
Under President Clinton’s Medicare reform proposal,
Medicare would contract with private-sector PPOs to
offer this alternative to beneficiaries. How this new option
would relate to the current fee-for-service program is not
fully clear. According to analysis of the proposal by
Marilyn Moon, this option would likely be viable only in
areas where Medicare payment levels are high relative to
other payers.31 The proposal also raises several questions,
such as how would out-of-network providers be paid and
what constraints would be placed on them? What incentives are available to encourage beneficiaries to select
preferred providers, given that co-payments for most are
already covered by Medigap policies and Medicare limits
the amount physicians can charge when beneficiaries seek
care outside the network?

Provider-Sponsored Organizations
Provider-based organizations lobbied intensively
from 1994 up until passage of the BBA to obtain the
right to contract directly with the Medicare program.
Motivated in part by an attempt to regain market power
and eliminate the insurance “middlemen,” hospital and
physician groups made inclusion of a PSO option under
Medicare a chief objective, one that was championed by
several leaders in Congress. Debate surrounding these
proposals centered on what standards should be applied
to PSOs and how the federal government and states
would share responsibility for regulating them.32
Despite all the initial enthusiasm, the PSO concept has
failed to take off. Several PSOs have participated in the
Medicare Choices demonstration, but a number of difficulties have been noted, especially control of utilization
under capitation. The BBA established a waiver process
to encourage the development of PSOs, but to date, there
is only one PSO operating under a waiver, and that plan
is withdrawing from the program this year. In a letter to
HCFA Administrator Nancy-Ann DeParle, the American
Hospital Association (AHA) said that
offering a Medicare+Choice plan may simply not be
doable, especially for start-up organizations. Program
requirements have expanded significantly, . . . [while]
plan payments are undergoing major methodological
changes that may not yield rates sufficient to comply
with HCFA’s requirements and permit plans to offer
a benefit package that would attract Medicare beneficiaries.33

Moreover, AHA points out that the large number of
well-established M+C plans scaling back or withdrawing from the program has sent up yellow caution flags
to potential plan applicants. In addition, the overall
effect of the BBA has left many hospitals with little or
no operating margin to use for venture capital, according to the AHA. Financial pressure from both public
and private payers has forced many hospitals to refocus
on their core business of health care delivery. In terms
of risk assumption, many hospitals have done a reversal
with regard to their acceptance of capitation. In 1998,
the number of hospitals receiving any capitated revenue
declined for the first time, while hospitals that did
accept capitation saw the average percentage of revenue
paid on a capitated basis drop to 8.0 percent, down from
10.7 percent in 1994.34

Private Fee-For-Service
A private fee-for-service option has emerged recently
as the most promising new option under M+C. Under this
arrangement, Medicare, as it does with HMOs, will pay
the private plan a premium to cover traditional Medicare
benefits and any supplemental benefits. But unlike
HMOs, plans can charge additional premiums and
copayments for the basic benefit package.
In July 2000, Sterling Life Insurance Co. began
offering Medicare’s first private fee-for-service product
to 8.2 million beneficiaries in 17 states. The company
plans to market Sterling Option 1 as a less expensive
alternative to Medigap and a more reliable alternative to
Medicare HMOs. In fact, the option has been seen by
some as a way to get around Medigap standardization
rules. Plan representatives have said they expect that the
volatility experienced by Medicare HMOs will help
boost the success of the private fee-for-service plan.35
Sterling will charge a $55 per month premium wherever
the plans are offered; the plan will not cover prescription drugs. The company’s newly approved private feefor-service plan will operate initially in 1,221 counties;
beneficiaries in 940 of those counties currently have no
M+C options available to them.

BBRA AND PENDING LEGISLATION
The BBRA, enacted on November 29, 1999, made
several modifications to the M+C program that were
designed to moderate the effect of many BBA provisions. In addition, several proposals now pending in
Congress would make significant changes to the current
M+C program, in terms of both how and how much
plans are paid and what benefits are covered.
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The BBRA made numerous changes in M+C
payment, contracting, and enrollment rules. The law
changed requirements regarding the definition of
service areas and the timing of premium submissions. It
also further backloaded the phase-in of risk adjustment.
The BBRA also established a new entry bonus for M+C
payment areas in which a M+C plan has not been
offered since 1997 (or from which, as of October 13,
1999, all organizations have filed a notice of withdrawal). In total, it is estimated that the BBRA will
restore an additional $4.8 billion for M+C plans over
the 2000 to 2004 period. Of this amount, $3.2 billion is
the result of the indirect pass-through effect of higher
payments to fee-for-service providers; $1.6 billion is a
direct result of measures addressing M+C payment
policy.
The predominant preoccupation of most federal
lawmakers today regarding Medicare policy is the
desire to provide outpatient prescription drug benefits
to Medicare beneficiaries. Proposals to provide such
benefits relate directly to the future of the M+C program, because many plans have used drug benefits as a
way to attract beneficiaries and have recently scaled
back on coverage as a result of payment reductions and
increasing drug costs. Most of these proposals call for
simultaneous reform of M+C payment policy. More
recently, interest in stabilizing the M+C program has
increased, and several bills have been introduced that
would directly address issues related to the current
payment and regulatory environment.36
The Clinton administration and Senate Democrats
generally want to expand the Medicare benefit package to
include prescription drugs (S. 2342). Under the Housepassed, GOP prescription drug plan (H.R. 4680), the
benefit would be provided through private plans that
would receive federal financial and administrative support. Each of these proposals would create a new Medicare Part D that would be voluntary for beneficiaries.
Under H.R. 4680, M+C plans would not be required to
offer Part D coverage, but those plans that did would have
to meet, as a minimum, standard coverage requirements.
M+C plans could receive reinsurance subsidies if they
provided actuarially equivalent or better drug coverage.
Under S. 2342, M+C plans providing equal or better
prescription drug coverage than the standard would be
eligible for full subsidies.
Clinton’s Medicare reform plan would set plan
payment rates through market competition rather than
a statutory formula. Plans would be required to submit
two bids on two packages, one with and one without a
prescription drug benefit. M+C plans would be explic-

itly paid for providing a standard drug benefit under the
president’s plan. Plans could offer additional benefits,
but they would have to be priced and sold as separate
packages that the enrollees could accept or reject.
H.R. 4680 contains numerous M+C payment reforms.
These include increasing payment updates, allowing
blended rates in 2002, providing a ten-year phase-in of
risk adjustment based on data from all settings, and
permitting higher payment rates through negotiations.
The “Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2000,” (S. 2807) introduced by Sens. John
Breaux (D-La.) and Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), would establish a new Competitive Medicare Agency as an independent executive branch agency. The new agency
would administer the M+C program and the new
Medicare Prescription Plus program. In 2003, it would
establish a new competitive system under M+C under
which plans would bid for the costs of delivering care
and compete based on benefits, price, and quality. A
proposal offered by Sen. William Roth (R-Del.) would
also initiate a competitive bidding approach and allow
M+C plans to bid on either the traditional or the expanded option plan.37 Both proposals contain short-term
payment improvements for M+C plans.

THE FORUM SESSION
The focus of this Forum session will be recent plan
withdrawals and their implications for the future of the
M+C program. In addition, this session will explore the
impact of these withdrawals on Medicare beneficiaries in
terms of costs, benefits, continuity of care, and general
confidence in the program. It will also look at various
policy options, including the addition of prescription drug
coverage to the basic Medicare benefit package.

Key Questions






What are the chief factors associated with plans’
participation decisions?
How have benefits provided by M+C plans changed
over the past few years? How do these trends compare with commercial plan benefit packages?
How have beneficiaries responded to these plan
withdrawals?
In 1999, both HCFA and GAO stated that they
expected to see continued program growth, despite
decisions of certain plans to withdraw. This expectation has not materialized. Should we expect continued declines or growth in participation in the future?
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Medicare managed care, although originally expected to save money, continues to add to program
cost. Why is that and what does it mean for proposals that rely on managed care to achieve program
savings in the future?

assistance, counseling, public education, and legal
advocacy for older persons. There are 19 SHIP projects in
Maryland, serving the entire state. Holzer has worked for
over 18 years in the field of health and human services
planning and coordination.

Should alternatives to full risk assumption be explored? What about alternatives to HCFA’s proposed risk-adjustment methodology?
How might Medicare prescription drug coverage
affect the future of M+C?
Would a mandatory competitive bidding approach
encourage more plan participation or less?

Speakers
William J. Scanlon, Ph.D., director of health
financing and public health for GAO, will present the
findings of GAO’s most recent report on Medicare+
Choice plan withdrawals (scheduled to be released
August 31). He will discuss the characteristics of the
plans that leave the program and what distinguishes
them from those that stay as well as what distinguishes
the geographic areas where plans stay from the areas
they leave. Before joining GAO in 1993, Scanlon was
co-director of the Center for Health Policy Studies and
an associate professor of family medicine at Georgetown University; earlier, he was a principal research
associate in health policy at the Urban Institute.
David H. Lemire, vice president, Senior Business
Segment, for CIGNA HealthCare, will discuss why his
company decided to withdraw from most of the markets
in which it participated as an M+C plan. He will also
discuss how the group retiree health market plays into
CIGNA’s business decisions. Lemire has more than 25
years of experience in the employee benefits field,
including sales, marketing, underwriting, new product
development, and communications. His assignment at
CIGNA was to create a national business providing
M+C products to retirees and their dependents. Since
CIGNA’s announced 2001 withdrawal from all but two
M+C markets, Lemire has been focused on providing
high-quality health care to CIGNA’s members while
winding down the business.
Michelle P. Holzer, program officer for the Maryland
Department of Aging’s senior health insurance program
(SHIP), will discuss the impact of plan withdrawals on
beneficiaries. In Maryland, 55,000 beneficiaries will be
affected by plan pullouts and only one plan out of four
will continue to participate in the program in 2001. SHIP
is a volunteer-based model program featuring claims
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